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This paper asks if China can develop a truly creative economy and follow the lead of 
South Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. If the benefits flowing from 
the creative economy (and creative industries) are so strategic to government, we need 
to ask what impact this reevaluation of creativity will have on a country often 
identified as having an overly regulated cultural sector. While there is ample evidence 
to support the idea of a dormant and often parasitic cultural sector, the paper points to 
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The model of a culture person has become fixed over time - someone who graduated 
from institutes of journalism, the classics, or film and television, and who might 
work in cultural propaganda units while coming together under the emblems of 
respective associations and academic groups. In debates about culture and in 
important policy decisions impacting on the cultural industry it is hard to hear the 
expert voices of economists and managers - those who own or invest in cultural 
enterprises - and especially those without a background in the liberal arts 
 
Miao and Chen (2003, 85). 
 
Innovation is the soul of a nation’s progressii  
(A prominent neon sign in Shanghai’s Nanjing 




In this paper I look at recent transformations within China’s cultural sector. I begin with 
an observation that Chinese consumers are embracing technology and various 
applications in a discerning way, which is resulting in rapid churn of products and a 
sorting out of positions between global brands and local competitors. In most global 
marketplaces such activity would reflect a highly innovative business milieu. However, 
China’s cultural economy is situated precariously between innovation and imitation. And 
despite the ever-present sloganeering about the importance of innovation, most instances 
of innovation occur at the formatting and distribution stage of the value chain rather than 
core creativity at the conceptual stage.  
 
This leads into a discussion of recent attempts within Chinese humanities institutes and 
universities to define the ambit of ‘cultural industries’, a concept that is relatively fluid 
but increasingly influenced by international trends. In the ensuing discussion I explain 
how an institutional environment of contending centripetal and centrifugal forces is 
hindering government and industry efforts to regulate the cultural marketplace and 
harness creativity. While the focus of the discussion is China, the latter part of the paper 
discusses creative industries developments in Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South 
Korea, and Taiwan. In these countries the value of the creative economy is clearly 
evident and has been taken up with zeal by policy makers. Two questions are then posed: 





China is often associated with abundance. In China’s mass market, much-hyped by 
prospective foreign investors, competition reform and consumer savvy contribute to offer 
a unique test-bed for products and services. Change is occurring at a rapid rate and 
reform has been accelerated by entry into the World Trade Organization - an event that 
has put Chinese business on notice. Meanwhile, competition is heating up for the hearts 
and minds of China’s consumers and lessons are being learnt. According to Jing Wang, 
rather than globalization eroding national culture or local knowledge countering, it is 
more accurate within the advertising industry to talk about synergy, by which the 
international and the local work to derive mutual benefit (Wang 2005 forthcoming). This 
synergy is apparent as one navigates the streets and subways of large cities in China. 
Here tradition jostles with commercial realities. International and domestic brand name 
products greet the eye. Advertisements for mobile phones depict glamorous images of 
young professionals, billboards announce the latest video game, and fashion magazines 
dominate newsstands.  
Such a scenario ought to make a global marketer’s pulse race. Indeed for many 
visitors to China’s bustling cities, the idea that China is a new creative hub is seductive. 
However, there is a cautionary tale to tell and I do this by locating the dynamics of 
perceived abundance within a framework that juxtaposes creativity and exploitative 
behaviour. The semantic shift to address ‘creativity’ within innovation is necessary to 
illustrate the limits of Chinese-style innovation, a theme to which I will return later in the 
 3
paper. The point that I want to stress at the outset is that core creativity may indeed be the 
missing ingredient in the Chinese innovation system. That is not to suggest that creativity 
is not evident throughout China but rather that in the rush to market it is not the most 
valued attribute. In fact, what is occurring in many cultural sectors is the borrowing of 
intellectual capital and creativity produced elsewhere (cf. Kitley 2003). 
I should point out at the outset that attempts to define creativity are notoriously 
difficult - but given the title of my paper I feel this is a necessary undertaking. A broad 
definition that privileges utility over aesthetics is that ‘creativity is the ability to come up 
with ideas that are new, surprising, and valuable’ (Boden 2004, 1). While this is hardly 
definitive, it has an advantage of clarity. Indeed, as Boden suggests, creativity is not 
something only found in cultural artifacts: it is a function of everyday activity: and it is 
fundamental to conceptual thinking, perception and reflective self-criticism. 
It is also a truism that some places are more creative than others. The lessons that 
have been learnt from film clusters such as Hollywood and Hong Kong are relevant and 
draw our attention to institutional factors that have led to the success of these regions (cf. 
Storper 1997, 83-103). The milieu approach is based on the idea that there are identifiable 
factors that permit creativity in some places rather than others. This ranges from 
investment capital, lifestyle factors, the presence of artists, to networks of stimulation. In 
this contextual approach some places are seen as more conducive to creativity - a point 
well made by Richard Florida who has produced ‘creativity indexes’ to account for the 
success of places such as Los Angeles and New York (Florida 2001). 
At this point we can add that a place or region’s capacity to be indexed as 
creative is capable of being enabled by policy that encourages investment, as much 
as through the presence of infrastructure such as publishing houses, performing arts 
complexes, conservatoriums, film, television and media centres, and universities. 
Alternatively, impediments to creativity include regulatory regimes, of which censorship 
policies are the most visible in China. Variations in creativity in different geographical 
locales can also be an outcome of cultural protection. Concerns about cultural identity 
that are reflected in local content regulations may in fact provide local producers with an 
opportunity for expression. For instance, in South Korea there are regulations that state 
that forty percent of film shown on local screens must be Korean. These regulatory 
regimes must be handled carefully, or at least skillfully moderated. As in China, too 




Cultural industries in the making (1990s-2004) 
 
If we take as a working premise the observation that cultural (and creative) industries are 
largely characterized by distinctive labour inputs that are the products of creative 
individuals (CIRAC & Cutler & Company 2003, 8) we encounter anomalies in China. In 
modern China’s period of socialist orthodoxy (from 1949 to the beginning of the 1990s), 
culture was described in conventional Marxist terms as the superstructure, reflecting the 
base, or the economic reality.  
Until the early 1990s the development of the cultural sector had been mediated by an 
industrial model of development in which standardized goods and commodities were 
 4
distributed to an imagined national community. Culture was produced rather than created, 
in a manner analogous to manufacturing; and cultural workers (including intellectuals) 
were duly celebrated as engineers of the soul (linghun de gongchengshe) - at least when 
they weren’t threatening to undermine the official culture. Cultural output was organised 
around quotas, and proscribed forms; and those who determined production criteria were 
in most cases bureaucrats with little sympathy for the autonomy of creative artists.  
While resembling an industrial model of production in the sense of standardized 
outputs, there was no recognition that culture could, or would become a key industry; nor 
was cultural production about diversification and differentiation. Despite economies of 
scale, the industrial model did not lead to diversity and it did not produce any unique and 
distinctive cultural goods and services that would find their way into overseas markets.iii   
The industrialisation of culture in China (as in other socialist regimes) is a well 
known story so there is no real need to rehearse its limitations. The industrialised model 
receded in the wake of economic reform and liberalisation and gave way to a market 
model of production during the mid-1980s and early 1990s. By the time China joined the 
World Trade Organization in December 2001 a consumer market had begun to drive 
production, particularly in new media value-added services.  
 In order to understand how state policy has evolved from the ‘engineering’ of culture 
to embrace culture as industry, it is helpful to briefly examine the research activities of 
key humanities centres in China charged with the responsibility of informing cultural and 
media policy. While the concept of the cultural market has existed since the early 1990s 
in policy discourse, the late-1990s witnessed a turn towards the term cultural industries.iv 
Aside from the conventional Marxist (base-superstructure) analyses that were prevalent 
in academic journals, many writers began to adopt the negative connotation of the culture 
industry as advanced by Adorno and Horkheimer (1997 [1947]). A preoccupation with 
the standardising effects of official culture (referred to in China as official mass culture) 
echoed dissatisfaction with commercial forms that were moving to fill the vacuum as the 
state backed off from overt cultural administration at the same time as social reforms, 
along with the development of broadcast media provided more outlets for expression. 
The rise of Chinese cultural studies during the early 1990s brought together a number of 
scholar critiquing the effects of power, albeit mostly foreign power rather than the power 
exercised by the Chinese state. In a recent publication this theoretical grouping is 
described as ‘cultural industries foundational theorists’ (Ye 2003, 17-19). This division, 
however, refers more to the fact that cultural studies critics focus on texts rather than 
policy. Within this division there exist a range of political positions.  
 The foundational camp, the members of this somewhat broad collective, are alleged 
to be less relevant today than the alternative theoretical grouping: the cultural industries 
‘application’ theorists. The latter’s provenance is dated to 1998, a time when the Ministry 
of Culture formally instituted a Cultural Industries Department within its responsibilities. 
This initiative followed on from the 15 year plan instigated in 1995 when the Chinese 
government had officially declared cultural industries to be part of national development. 
A Cultural Industries Research and Innovation Centre was founded at Shanghai’s 
Jiaotong University, which in collaboration with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
launched a series of industry reports reminiscent of the UK creative industries mapping 
projects (Zhang et al 2002; 2003; 2004). In 2003 the Ministry of Culture gave the 
go-ahead for a second institute this time located in Beijing: the State Cultural Industries 
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Innovation and Development Research Institute. Not surprisingly, the green light for 
cultural industries had already spawned a steady stream of articles and books focusing on 
development strategies to transform and regulate China’s burgeoning but largely 
inefficient cultural economy in the lead up to the WTO accession, a moment that was 
acknowledged as the next stage of liberalisation. This was the time for scholars with 
expertise in economics and business to assume the role of ‘engineers of innovation’.   
The looming challenge of global integration into the WTO, the world’s premier 
trading club, was a catalyst for the focus on cultural development and innovation. 
Restructuring of China’s media also echoed global developments, particularly the 
increasing number of mergers and acquisitions in the media sector that were seen by local 
interests to give foreign companies added muscle. Much attention at the time was focused 
on China’s vulnerability in the face of inroads by transnationals such as Time Warner, 
News Corporation, and Bertelsmann. In setting out a cultural industries development 
agenda, the Chinese government was assessing how to respond to a perceived crisis.  
A second reason for China to reform its cultural sector is the scale of 
informatization (xinxihua) - a term widely used in China to describe the uptake of ICTs. 
Growth of China’s IT industry has been maintained at two to three times GDP over the 
last decade and e-government has been rolled out in a bid to provide new streamlined 
services for business (Ke 2003). Fast-tracking China’s IT industry has been one of the 
key elements of China’s 10th Five Year Plan, with an emphasis on making digital 
television and broadband affordable and available. The influence of the moving image 
(and more recently streaming video) is considerable. Since the 1970s people have had 
access to cable television delivered through master access television (MATV) systems in 
apartment buildings. Now with more than 10 million broadband subscribers, 70 million 
Internet users, 200 million plus mobile phone subscribers, and potentially many millions 
of digital television users, China is a huge market for content. Much of this content is 
currently supplied by proximate cultural regions such as SAR Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
South Korea. 
A well-documented creative renaissance in East Asia (see below) has in turn 
contributed towards the development of China’s cultural industries. The greater 
efficiencies that have occurred in the region as a result of restructuring communication 
and cultural sectors include greater opportunities for creative entrepreneurs, a more direct 
focus on innovation and product differentiation, an increase in outsourcing activity, and 
the distribution of creative content in new markets, often through service sectors of the 
new economy.  
 
Innovation is the soul of a nation’s progress 
 
The idea of innovation is writ large in the contemporary Chinese consciousness. As 
mentioned above, accession to the WTO in December 2001 witnessed a period of 
national soul-searching in which innovation (chuangxin) became a major topic at industry 
and government levels. The concept, according to an expert theorist, is not new in China 
(Yi 2000). All China’s great socialist theorists - from Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping 
through to Jiang Zemin (and including Marx and Lenin), have talked about innovation, 
although they imagined it operating in differing ways, such as getting rid of the old and 
replacing it with the new, a convenient way of making policy in Communist China. The 
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real champion of innovation, however, was Jiang Zemin, whose words on the subject 
were reported in the Enlightenment Daily on 5 March, 1998:  
 
We must now put the stress on innovation. We need to establish national awareness; 
to set up a national innovation system and to strengthen entrepreneurial innovation 
capacity, to put science and innovation in a more important strategic position, and 
accordingly allow economic construction to revolve around scientific progress and 
the improvement of the quality of workers  
 
(cited in Yi 2000, 41). 
 
China’s search for an innovation system is itself a reflection of global developments, 
notably in the science and technology field. However, the innovation sloganeering 
evident on China’s billboards, and in the designation of its research centres ironically 
highlights a palpable weakness in the cultural sector compared to China’s East Asian 
neighbours. Chinese cinema has languished in comparison for want of investment, as 
much as the lack of creative latitude extended to its writers and producers. Chinese 
television is largely imitative of foreign formats (Keane 2003). Notable exceptions 
include advertising, which has embraced the language of creativity (see Keane and 
Spurgeon 2004; Wang 2003; Wang 2005), and industrial design and architecture, which 
are developing distinctive nuances (Simons 2003). 
Two perspectives on creativity are evident in China today. First, that several decades 
of regimented conformity and state regulation have created an ‘innovation deficit 
effect’; and second, that pockets of innovation exist that are a response to 
entrepreneurial opportunities and economic liberalisation.  
Paradoxically, innovation may also be a response, or reaction to a perceived 
innovation deficit. That is, as regimented conformity becomes regimented 
boredom, people switch off and turn on to ‘foreign’ products and services. For 
example, the surfeit of propaganda documentary inflicted upon Chinese television 
viewers during the 1980s had by the late 1990s led to a breakthrough in programming 
genres - the introduction of new docu-soaps and interactive reality game shows.  
In assessing recent developments of this sort it is worth drawing attention to the fact 
that media internationalization of the sort that has occurred in South China’s Guangdong 
Province is provisional and likely to be different to what is allowed in North China. South 
China has for some time been seen as test bed of internationalisation with foreign 
companies such as News Corporation, Phoenix Satellite Television, and 
CETV/AOL-Time Warner being accorded limited landing rights.v The role of local 
initiatives in contracting, franchising, or forming joint ventures with international players 
provides an example of synergy. For instance News Corporation’s STAR China has 
co-production partners in Shanghai, Hunan and Shenzhen. STAR also commissions local 
production companies to produce content for its Mandarin satellite channel Starry Skies 
(xingkong weishi). 
Such initiatives invariably often occur in places more receptive to 
change - and through producers more willing to take a risk by partnering up with 
international players. The ‘entrepreneurial’ Hunan television station in South China has 
collaborated with ESPN to produce European soccer matches. Granada Television (UK) 
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has used a Hong Kong/Beijing co-production model to introduce its long-running soap 
formula, Coronation Street/ (Joy Luck Street) Chinese style. Strategic alliances are to be 
also found in the music and industries as international stars team up with Chinese (and 
Hong Kong) stars. While the 5th wave film director Chen Kaige went to Hollywood, US 
songstress Beyonce Knowles conspired to break into the Asian market by performing a 
duet with Taiwanese boy band idol Vanness Wu (Fowler 2003, 34). The mechanics of 
internationalization are therefore both formal and informal: they are mediated by political 
imperatives, cultural nuances, local initiatives, and foreign investment. 
The macro-setting that is most prevalent, however, is that of an innovation 
deficit. There is a great deal of support for the innovation deficit view coming from 
within China, where cultural goods and services distributed by multinational media 
companies are seen as being more reliable and providing better after sales service in 
comparison to Chinese product. This brings to the foreground a tendency to reclaim the 
adage ‘Western learning for application, Chinese culture as the essence (xixue wei yong, 
zhong xue wei ti). The point of this slogan is its ubiquity as much as utility in justifying 
technology transfer. ‘Western’ learning (and technology) is seen as complementary - and 
more importantly - internalized within China’s modernity project. Comparison with a 
mythical West - which is itself problematic given the contemporary nature of 
globalization - applies to all aspects of modernization in China, including the law, 
academic disciplines such as sociology, communications studies, and advertising. 
 
Centripetal forces: new institutional strategies 
 
In China today large media and cultural clusters pull activity towards regional centres. In 
the contemporary parlance of economic development and modernisation this process is 
called conglomerate formation (jituanhua) but with a newfound prominence given to 
‘institution grouping, enterprise management’ (shiye jituan, qiye guanli), rather than the 
cadre system of bureaucratic supervision that regulated standardized production. Under 
these arrangements large conglomerates aim to nurture ‘profit centres’, which have 
greater autonomy as well as the capacity to outsource.   
Centres such as these have been midwifed into existence by central and local 
governments with some involvement of foreign capital and technology. In the main 
their prime function is to serve as ‘market organisers’ or core systems integrators 
(Nolan 2001, 119-122). There is a recognition here of a value chain that wasn’t in 
evidence prior to the 1990s. In other words, there are efficiencies to be gained from 
grouping that are not just about scale economies: these include network consolidation, 
research and development capacity, distribution management, and joint venture 
management. Key systems integrators such as China Central Television (CCTV), 
which has recently entered into a partnership to supply broadband content to Real 
Networks China, play a key role in planning through selection of suppliers - those 
with whom they will form long term relationships. 
The institutional grouping model is a deliberate attempt to refashion the 
Chinese bureaucratic network (where functions and products were systemically 
replicated and distributed to mass markets) into a new quasi-oligopoly that is 
informed by global business trends. The call by leading spokespersons has been for 
the formation of ‘national champions’ that are a response to international competition. 
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In the politicized imperative of responding to crisis (see Keane and Donald 2002) the 
threat of cultural imperialism is evoked by metaphors of ‘motherships’ and ‘cultural 
aircraft carriers’ (wenhua hangmu) while the popularization of ‘national 
brands’ (minzu pinpai) is presumed to evoke national pride and consumer loyalty, 
although as Jing Wang argues, the line between international and national is now less 
important in Chinese consumer’s minds than the quality of the product itself (Wang 
2005). 
An example of conglomerate formation within a ‘clustering’ environment is the 
media avenue in Beijing, which is currently under construction in the Xuanwu 
District. The avenue area is designed to become a comprehensive community of 
industries involved in journalism, publishing, film and television, Internet, as well as 
conventions and exhibitions. The avenue will cover an area of 116 hectares, and is 
expected to cost a total of 28 billion yuan (3.4 billion US dollars) (People’s Daily 24 
Oct. 2001). 
In similar developments a series of broadcasting conglomerates have formed 
since 2001, drawing together resources and skills. The largest 
of these is the Beijing-based China Radio, Film and TV Group (CRFTG) with fixed 
assets of more than RMB20 billion. Formed in December 2001 this jituan comprises 
China Central Television, two state radio stations, China National Radio (CNR), 
China Radio International (CRI), as well as some state film and network organs. It 
also includes the powerful Gehua Consortium, which operates cable networks in the 
Beijing area. On May 21 2002 the conglomerate added to its stable the China Radio, 
Film and TV Exchange Centre. 
China’s second largest media jituan is the Shanghai Media and Group (SMG), 
whose existence actually preceded the CRFTG. The Shanghai group was formed in 
2000 and has total assets of RMB10.7 billion with over 5200 staff. This group takes 
on board the two major television stations, Shanghai Television and Shanghai 
Oriental Television, as well as an advertising and program marketing centre. SMG is 
seeking to promote itself as an alternative to CCTV, modeling its development on a 
Rupert Murdoch’s BSkyB model. In late 2003 SMG launched an ambitious attempt to 
undermine CCTV’s sports hegemony by financing a Chinese Superleague (zhongchao).vi   
Likewise, a wave of consolidation in China's book industry has seen 12 major 
Beijing-based publishing houses and distribution companies joining together to form 
the China Publishing Group. The dozen include some of the country's most prestigious 
publishers and book traders including the People's Publishing House, the People's 
Literature Publishing House, the Commercial Press and the Xinhua Bookstore Head 
Office (Peoples Daily 10 April 2002). 
 
 
Centrifugal: the rise of independents 
 
A centrifugal dynamic sees as an increasing number of independent creative 
entrepreneurs, some of whom also work for the multi-conglomerates as specialist 
providers. Those that now find career paths in providing such services are evidence of the 
breakdown of the bureaucratisation of production, although the extent of bureaucratic 
control in China has often been overplayed through comparison to a free market model of 
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production. At least we can confidently assert that during the 1990s, more spaces have 
opened up for creative endeavour. Changes are illustrated in the contexts of creation, 
production, and distribution: the upstream and downstream activities of the value chain. 
For instance, a film maker in the 1980s was a person who was trained in a state institution 
such as the Beijing Broadcasting Institute or the Chinese Academy of Fine Arts. At this 
time person found employment in a work unit attached to a film or 
television centre, for instance, China Central Television or the Changchun Film 
Studio. This person was classified generically as a cultural worker (wenyi gongzuo 
zhe) in addition to their specific role i.e. producer or director. By the early 1990s several 
quasi-independent companies had set up (such as Wang Shuo’s Seahorse Production 
company), allowing greater control over scripts and financing (although scripts still 
had to be vetted by the responsible ministry). But in the main production and 
distribution were still locked together with major players such as CCTV being the 
monopoly buyers of what were adjudged to be high quality works with attendant 
reward structures in place. Other products within the marketplace were distributed in 
a more informal manner through barter, a process that put a premium on quantity 
rather than quality. 
By way of contrast, we find in 2003 that the relationships have shifted 
somewhat. There are now many film-makers, scriptwriters, and independent 
producers plying their wares, both inside state organizations as well as pitching their 
skills to a range of buyers including foreign consortiums such as STAR China. 
Independent production is on the increase along with greater ease of production due to 
digital technology. The producer/ creator is no longer first and foremost defined as a 
cultural worker. S/he can also be an entrepreneur, a cultural intermediary, and a 
person employed by non-state i.e. international companies. While funding of 
production remains fragmented, this is offset by the fact that there are wider markets 
for sale, including international festivals, niche channels, and Internet services. However, 
the big organizations, (now radically restructured as described above) remain 
prime buyers of products and human capital. 
Instances of creative enterprise, and degrees of internationalization, are 
also contingent on milieu factors including open environments for stimulation,  
technological infrastructure, and a mix of expertise, political connections, and 
‘know-how’. Shanghai’s commercial milieu is arguably working to construct it as an 
applications centre, an advertising heartland, and a games development hub, while 
Beijing, long regarded as conservative and political, becomes China’s intellectual 
hub - as well as the most likely place to incubate creativity, evident in the rock music and 
avant-garde art scenes.vii    
China also throws up a disparate spread of cultural workers and intermediaries: : 
artists, fashion designers, directors, as well as many unruly opportunists who 
have come into existence and who make money from culture by simply copying and 
distributing work produced by others. This is the dynamic but non innovative side of the 
cultural economy. In 2002 the value of legitimate sales of music was US$110 million 
while the figure for pirated sales was US$533 (Fowler 2003, 35). 
 Statistics pertaining to the cultural industries in China cannot be directly correlated 
with international benchmarks and are therefore best read as indicators of sectoral growth. 
According to Chinese Ministry of Culture, the value of the cultural sector increased from 
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1.21 billion yuan ($USD146 Million) in 1990 to 8.37 billion yuan ($USD1.01 billion) in 
1998, representing a six-fold increase. Meanwhile the number of registered organizations 
associated with culture increased from 68,000 to 92,000 – an increase of 35%. 
Employment in the cultural sector increased 46%, from 495,000 to 721,000 during the 
same period. Most significantly, the number of private enterprises engaged in some form 
of cultural activity increased rapidly. In 1990 the private cultural sector numbered less 
than government cultural units. By 1998 private enterprises constituted 2.7 times the 
number of public units and the level of employment and the value of output was 1.5 times 
that of the official public cultural sector (Ministry of Culture 2003). When one takes into 
account that all of China’s media are state owned, the dynamism of the surrounding or 
non-core enterprises is evident.  
 Despite impressive growth statistics and activity within the private sector, China’s 
cultural consumption lags behind international benchmarks. Whereas cultural industries 
have become mainstay contributors to GDP in developed countries, the value of the 
(national) cultural economy in China in 1998 occupied just 0.26% of GDP and 0.8% of 
the services sector. By comparison the cultural economy of the USA contributes an 
estimated 7% to GDP. In 1997 the consumption of culture and entertainment services per 
resident was 2.35% of total consumption, far below the level of developed countries and 
less than other developing countries (Ministry of Culture 2003). While these figures tell a 
less than impressive picture it should be noted that the majority of China’s population are 
classified as peasants, despite recent trends suggesting massive urbanization. Moreover, 
if we look at mega-cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chongqing, and Tianjin 
we find a strong level of cultural consumption. According to a recent report, the 
consumption of knowledge-based services by Beijing residents comprised more than 4% 
of expenditure (Luo & Zhao 2003). It also needs to be noted that there is also a high 
degree of elasticity inherent in these figures taking into account the grey economy and the 
high incidence of pirated cultural goods. In other words, much cultural consumption is 
not registered as market sales. 
The basic value chain of Chinese creative industries/cultural industries is impacted 
upon by numerous impediments in the distribution channels segment. In this sense it 
demonstrates unique characteristics that allow products to reach consumers more directly 
than the formal commercial route of proscribed distribution outlets, venues, and galleries. 
However, the high incidence of informal distribution of products (such as pirated DVDs 
and music CDs) and the frequent barter of services and content has seriously impacted 
upon the capacity to grow creative enterprises. Informal relationships based on guanxi 
(networks) further hinder the implementation of professionalism and best practice. 
Moreover, the large numbers at either end of the value chain (creators and end-users) 
mean that a great deal of importance is focused on the middle segments, which are 
stymied by institutional rigidities: for instance the role played by market makers - in 
many instances, officials who preside over allocation of book numbers, television 
production licenses, and permits.  
The concept of creativity, aside from the advertising industry, remains distinctly 
foreign. According to Zhang Xiaoming, deputy director of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences Humanities Institute and the editor of the Blue Book of Chinese Culture, 
the idea of creativity in China remains something that is upstream of cultural 
production.viii In other words, creativity is the source. Of course, this is a 
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well-documented footnote on all Chinese cultural production in recent decades. Chinese 
artists and producers are arguably as creative as their peers in South Korea, Japan or the 
U.S. for that matter. The problem is that creativity, if it is to be distributed, has to be 
channelled into designated areas. The institutionalised nature of cultural production in 
China is perhaps best represented by the publishing industry. In order to produce a 
publication one needs to obtain a book number (shuhao) from the regulator. According to 
Zhang, this need to appease regulatory bodies constrains real creativity. 
 
Creative industries: assessing the regional impact 
  
In the introduction I posed two questions: first, how does the momentum of creative 
industries so evident in the East Asia region transfer to China? And second, how is 
creativity valued in China? Before answering these questions, I will first briefly sketch 
out the environment. 
The most proximate centre to mainland China is Hong Kong. The special 
administrative zone is regarded as a creative centre in Asia, its film and music industry, 
exemplifying action aesthetic and Canto-pop respectively. Moreover, this densely 
populated ‘hub’ with its history of entrepreneurial activity, has accrued certain 
advantages such as spillover, joint-venture productions, and franchising arrangements 
due to the aggregation of transnational service industries: in Hong Kong's case, 
cross-fertilisation of creative ideas is common among the film, television, comics and 
game software industries. 
In contrast with the recognised resourcefulness of Hong Kongers, Singapore 
provides a different perspective on creative industries. Creativity is regarded as an 
antidote to an ailing economy. A Creative Industries Development Strategy has recently 
been unveiled ‘to propel the growth of Singapore’s Creative Economy and create new job 
possibilities for Singaporeans’. The vision now is to establish for Singapore a reputation 
as a vibrant and exciting New Asia creative hub in addition to its renowned 
communications and transport hub capacity. In Singapore the fastest-growing creative 
industries are IT, performing arts, cinema services and advertising (Ministry of Trade 
and Industry 2003). 
In Korea there are major developments in film, television, 
animation, and video games, as well as a new Digital Media City of 1.44 hectares in 
Seoul that is being constructed close to universities. Investors have poured money into 
South Korea’s entertainment industries, introducing professionalism and accountability in 
an industry once seen as shady. The television industry has swept aside the reliance on 
foreign programs, cleverly learning from foreign models but tapping into local structures 
of feeling (Lee Dong-Hoo 2003). Following the 1990s dot.com crash companies such as 
SM Entertainment and record label YBM Seoul went public while other start-up 
entertainment businesses took advantage of government largesse towards culture 
industries and venture capital seed money. According to Suh-kyung Yoon, ‘Money has 
allowed the industry to prosper, but competition has sparked its creativity’ (Yoon 2001, 
2). Korea’s broadband capacity has also provided a fertile environment for the 
development of multi-player games such as Lineage of Mir, now finding target 
audiences in China.  
In Taiwan the term creative cultural industries has been adopted as part of the 
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government’s commitment to stimulating local cultural identity and protecting local 
content. Debates are still ensuing as to where Taiwan’s comparative advantage lies, 
with some observers suggesting that Taiwan should position itself as the pop music 
centre of East Asia and others backing Taiwan’s Chinese heritage. Vice Economics 
Minister Shih Yen-hsiang has argued that ‘cultural strength’ is the backbone of 
Taiwan’s content-based industries (Lee 2003).  
Japan is also looking to creativity to kick-start its ailing economy. Japan’s 
cultural influence remains strong through a visible pop culture that is disseminated 
mainly throughout Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Mainland China, and also reaching 
markets in the USA and Europe. Icons such as Hullo Kitty, licensed 
by the Sanrio consortium, derive almost US1 billion sales per year, while Japanese 
anime influence is felt in Hollywood blockbuster films such as The Matrix and Dark 
Angel (McGray 2002, 4). While Japan’s cultural industries have been founded 
on the success of Sony walkman, anime and video games, there are suggestions that 
Japan needs to links an under-performing service sector with the benefits of 
creativity to create the kind of cultural economy statistics evident in the US and the 
UK, both contributing over 7% to GDP in contrast to Japan’s 3% (Ryan 2003). 
There are, however, incongruities and inconsistencies in how these statistics are 
formulated across different national territories. Japan has a strong cultural export 
culture, which is supported by government programs to exert Japanese influence into 
Asian markets. It has strong performing mobile Internet industries, led by DoCoMo’s 




As part of animation courses in Chinese universities a large emphasis is placed on 
learning to draw Disney characters. Is this coincidental with China’s role as an 
outsourcing centre for Hollywood or an indication of a deeper malaise? I would like to 
suggest that China’s attempts to position itself in the global creative economy - or to at 
least become a significant exporter of cultural goods and services rather than simply a 
low cost location for manufacturing - is dependent on a number of factors.  
First, accession to the World Trade organization has provided openings for foreign 
enterprises, with the promise of more to come. Many ‘foreigners’ working in 
creative industries have already partnered with Chinese companies in order 
to circumvent local content requirements. The issue at stake here is how to build synergy, 
that leads to greater value-adding rather than using a joint venture relationship purely for 
short-term gain. 
Second, while innovation is widely touted, there is an acknowledgement among 
many critics and industry professionals that China needs to re-assess its cultural 
industries development approach due to a tendency to favour imitation over innovation. 
In short, while innovation is a theoretical catch word, it has yet to be transformed into 
practice. Innovation without creativity means that the pressure is on business to produce 
products and services that capture markets. As markets are fragmented, there is a 
tendency to borrow creativity from elsewhere.  
Third, this raises the issue of the impact ‘trade in creativity’ will have on Chinese 
production. International creative companies are re-evaluating their business models as 
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the problem of piracy and imitation impacts upon bottom lines. There is not a great 
amount of money to be made currently out of selling media content into China. It is felt 
by many international companies that the best asset they have to offer is indeed creativity. 
The question is how do they turn a profit? If not content, then perhaps there is a market 
for ideas, management expertise, and related value-added services.  
Fourth, China’s aspiration to become a producer of creative content is framed by its 
response to the pressures of international law. This implies the implementation of 
copyright regimes that will impact upon the relationships between content creators 
and other players in the value chain. Currently pirated DVDs and CDs are hampering 
the development of China’s domestic marketplace as well as creating ambivalence 
among international investors. In a similar vein China needs to address local practices 
of duplicate construction, the widespread replication of goods and services in different 
locations that has lead to parasitic forms of imitation while retarding innovation. 
On a more positive note, China’s strategies in building a competitive cultural 
marketplace may well provide lessons for the international community and particularly 
may provide an alternative to the Washington Consensus ideal that large enterprises 
ought to give way to a sea of new small, and medium scale enterprises (see Nolan 2001, 
3). The question in this regard is: can China’s state-formed conglomerates become 
national champions – that is, real competitors who can take on the multi-national forces 
of Time Warner, Bertelsmann, and Starbucks? A lot depends on how these new 
groupings give play to the creative energy of producers, artists, and particularly 
entrepreneurs. An important development therefore is the role that entrepreneurs play in 
the reconfiguration of China’s cultural economy and its creative industries more 
specifically. As indicated in the second quote at the beginning of this article, there has 
been a long-held view that cultural debate and decisions emanate from liberal arts 
institutes and propaganda units in China, a perspective that has marginalised the voices of 
the many persons working and earning their living in creative industries. 
In looking at the sectors where innovation is emerging – such as advertising and the 
digital content industries - it is important to note institutional factors that allow these 
instances to occur. Government innovation policies are having some traction despite the 
propensity to imitate within the marketplace. In this sense China is closely monitoring 
developments in the region. Singapore presents a working model that sees a 
quasi-authoritarian regime using cultural restoration policies in a bid to restore popular 
confidence and stimulate the economy. Closer to home, Hong Kong stands tall as a 
Chinese city with a global cultural brand, mainly acquired through its movie industry. 
Furthermore, Chinese researchers are now looking more closely at the success of South 
Korean creative industries (Chen 2003). The fact that South Korea managed to navigate 
the Asian economic crisis and to emerge with new state and private investment in its 
creative content industries rather than production remaining an in-house function of 
industry chaebols, provides a salutatory lesson for China, itself attempting to reshape 
and professionalize its cultural economy around its new institutional groupings.  
In April 2004 an important article appeared as the first provocation in a new online 
forum ‘China Culture Market Net’ (Zhongguo wenhua shichang wang). Endorsed by the 
Ministry of Culture, the forum signalled that a new relationship between creativity and 
innovation had been noted at the highest level (Liu 2004). Entitled ‘Bring about a 
creative century: take action to develop a Creative China’, the article referenced creative 
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industries developments globally, and particularly those in Singapore, Hong Kong, and 
Korea. Noting that one of the core problems in China was the ‘duck style feeding’ (tianya 
shi) of students in educational institutions, the author, Liu Shifa, argued that China had to 
make the transformation from an economy that over-emphasizes learning from others – 
one that ‘inherits tradition, follows others, copies, and brings in’ other cultures - to a 
‘creative economy’ where creativity is the priority strategy and originality is 
acknowledged and valued. Creativity therefore has to be instilled. In noting that 
government was the primary consumer of services and hence had the greatest demand the 
paper nominated a role for it in leading the creative movement, by amongst other things 
reducing direct subsidy to producers and instead acting as a procurer of creative goods 
and services. Other initiatives, although not spelt out in detail, included taxation 
incentives to pump-prime the creative economy, a strategic reassessment of intellectual 
property protection, and a bringing together of government, enterprises and education in 
creative industry pilot projects.   
In placing aspirations for a creative China within a global context, the fact that 
internationalisation is proceeding at an unprecedented pace and creativity from outside 
China remains a highly valued commodity implies that a brave new world is indeed 
opening up. While the provenance of creative industries is Western, the idea is now 
global. There remain, however, many impediments to realizing the creative future laid 
out by the new visionaries. From the new institutional conglomerates down to individual 
producers, the core prerogative is to enable value and instil professionalism into the 
creative value chain. Only with these foundations intact can creativity play a key role in 




Adorno, T. and Horkheimer, M. 1997 [1947] Dialectic of Enlightenment. London: 
Verso. 
 
Boden, Margaret A. 2004. The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms. 2nd edition, 
London: Routledge. 
 
Chen, Chao. 2003. Culture: the new engine for city development in the new century. 
In The Blue Book of China’s Culture ed. Zhang Xiaoming et al. Beijing: Social 
Sciences Documentation Publishing. 
 
CIRAC & Cutler & Company. 2003. Research and Innovation Systems in the Production 
of Digital Content: Report for the National Office for the Information Economy, National 
Office for the Information Economy, Canberra.    
 
ERC. 2002. Economic Review Committee. Singapore's Creative Industries 
Development Strategy. Ministry of Trade and Industry, 25 September 2002. See 
http://www.mti.gov.sg/public/ERC/frm_ERC_Default.asp?sid=131 
 
Florida, Richard. 2002. The Rise of the Creative Class and How it’s Transforming 
Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life. New York: Basic Books. 
 15
 
Fowler, Geoffrey. 2003. Dynamic duets. Far Eastern Economic Review. July 31, 2003: 
34-35 
 
Ke, Huixin. 2003 China. In Digital Review of Asia Pacific. ed. Chin Saik Yoon. 
Penang: Southbound Press. 
 
Keane, Michael. 2003. A revolution in programming and a great leap forward for 
production. In Television Across Asia: Formats, Television Industries and Globalization. 
eds. A. Moran and M. Keane, London: RoutledgeCurzon. 
 
Keane, Michael, and Donald, Stephanie Hemelryk. 2002. Responses to crisis, 
convergence, content industries, and media governance. In Media in China: Consumption, 
Content & Crisis, Eds, S.H. Donald, M. Keane and Yin Hong, London: RoutledgeCurzon 
 
Keane, Michael and Spurgeon, Chris (2004) Advertising industry and culture in 
post-WTO China. Media International Australia (forthcoming). 
 
Kitley, Philip. 2003. Closing the creativity gap: renting intellectual capital in the name of 
local content. In Television Across Asia: Formats, Television Industries and Globalization. 
eds. A. Moran and M. Keane, London: RoutledgeCurzon. 
 
Lee, Abby. 2003. Commercializing creativity and culture. Government information 
Office http://publish.gio.gov.tw/FCJ/past/03032871.html. Accessed 27 April, 2004. 
 
Lee, Dong-Hoo. 2003. A local mode of programme adaptation: South Korea in the 
global format business. In Television Across Asia; Television Industries, Formats and 
Globalisation eds. A. Moran and M. Keane. London: RoutledgeCurzon. 
 
Liu, Shifa. 2004. Bring about a creative century: take action to develop a Creative China. 
China Culture Market. (Zhongguo wenhua shichang wang) April 2004. 
http://www.ccm.gov.cn/netCultureChannel/main/lt-cyzg.html  Accessed April 28, 2004. 
 
Luo Liyuan and Zhao Mulan. 2003 Knowledge industries in Beijing. In China’s 
Future in the Knowledge Economy eds. Bhajan Grewal, Lan Xue, Peter Sheehan and 
Fiona Sun. Victoria University and Tsinghua University Press, 326-333. 
 
McGray, Douglas. 2002. Japan’s gross national cool Foreign Policy. May-June see 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_mayjune_2002/mcgray.html 
 
Miao, Qihao, and Chen, Chao. 2003 Renewing knowledge of culture and cultural 
industries in the 21st century. In A Review of China’s Cultural Industries eds.Ye 
Quyuan, Wang Yongzhang, and Chen Xin. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s University 
Publishing. 
 
Ministry of Culture. 2003. Enterprise, Innovation Forum International. Available:    
http://www.eifi.com.cn/gaofengzixun/wenhacy/whcy.htm [Accessed: 24/03/2004]. 
 16
 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. 2003. See 
http://www.mti.gov.sg/public/PDF/CMT/NWS_2003Q1_Creative.pdf?sid=165&cid=163
0. 
Accessed 27 April, 2004. 
 
Nolan, Peter. 2001. China and the Global Economy, National Champions, Industrial 
Policy, and the Big Business Revolution, Hampshire: Palgrave. 
 
Ryan. P. 2003. The creative economy: creative clusters key to knowledge-based economy 
(including Japan)?. Marubeni Economic Report Tokyo: Marubeni Corporation Economic 
Research Institute. See http://www.marubeni.co.jp/research/eindex/0301b/body.html 
 
Simons, Craig. 2003. Designing a new China. Far Eastern Economic Review. Dec. 
25- Jan 1 2004. 
 
Storper, Michael. 1997 The Regional World; Territorial Development in a Global 
Economy. New York: The Guildford Press. 
 
Wang Jing. 2003. Framing Chinese Advertising: Some Industry Perspectives on the 
Production of Culture, Continuum, 17 (3): 247-260. 
 
Wang, Jing, 2005. From Advertising to Branding: Framing Chinese Consumer Culture, 
London: RoutledgeCurzon. 
 
Ye, Lang (2003) China’s Cultural Industries Yearly Report, Changsha: Hunan People’s 
Publishing.  
 
Yi Jixiong. (2000). Innovation Theory, Anhui Arts Publishing: Hefei. 
 
Yoon, Sun-kyung. 2001. Swept up on a wave. Far Eastern Economic Review, 
October 18. 
 
Zhang, Xiaoming, Hu Huilin, and Zhang Jiangang. eds. 2002. The Blue Book of 
China’s Culture. Beijing: Social Sciences Documentation Publishing. 
 
Zhang, Xiaoming, Hu Huilin, and Zhang Jiangang. eds. 2003. The Blue Book of 
China’s Culture. Beijing: Social Sciences Documentation Publishing 
 
Zhang, Xiaoming, Hu Huilin, and Zhang Jiangang. eds. 2004. The Blue Book of 




                                                        
ii In Chinese: 创新是一个民族进步的灵魂 Chuangxin shi yi ge minzu jinbu de linghun 
iii The Diasporic Chinese population, a potentially huge market for Chinese culture, have largely consumed 
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